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1. The Question of Death 
Human death is shrouded in doubt. The human condition is not only 
tormented by pain and by the grad ual breaking-up of the body but also by 
the d read of forever ceasing to be. All the aids of technology, however useful 
they may be, cannot set our anguished minds at rest. They may prolong 
life-span or give comfort , but this does not satisfy the heartfelt longing for a 
life to come. I 
In Gaudium et Spes, the Second Vatican Council explained that while 
the mind is at a loss before the mystery of death , the Church, taught by 
divine revelation, declares that God has created man in view of a blessed 
destiny which lies beyond the limits of his state on earth: 
Moreover, the C hristian faith teaches that bodily dea th . fr om wh ich man would 
have been immune had he not sinned. will be overcome when that wholeness which 
he lost through hi s own fa ult will be given once again to him by the almighty and 
merciful Saviour. For God has called man, and still calls him. to c leave with a ll hi s 
being to him in sharing for eve r a life tha t is Divine and free from all decay. Christ 
won this victory when he rose to life. for by his dea th he freed man from death 2 
The mystery surrounding death has been in some ways deepened by the 
advent of the new life support technologies which are able to replace the 
function of several vital organs and hence prevent the sudden deterioration 
of tissues which normally confirms that death has occurred. At the same 
time the questions raised by the capacity of the technology lead to the 
making of new distinctions, a greater understanding of the mystery of death 
and the refinement of traditional teachings . 
The definition of death is at once a theological issue. Faith and reason 
demand consistency and the Christian definition of death must be 
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reconcilable with Christian belief in the resurrection of the body and life 
after death . 
St. Paul refers to death of the body as a change to the person not the 
death of the person: 
I will tell you something that has been secret: that we are not all going to die . but we 
shall all be changed. This will be instantaneous. in the twinkling of an eye. when the 
last trumpet sounds. It will sound. and the dead shall be raised imperishable and 
we shall be changed as well. because our present imperishable nature must put on 
impehshability and this mortal nature must put on immortalityJ 
Human death is the cessation of a human life, but a full explanation of it 
must explain the continuity of the identity of the person through the 
profound changes of death. 
In this task , theology informs and then is aided by philosophy. The 
theological understanding of the human condition and of the resurrection 
of the body sets the agenda for the Christian philosopher to seek a 
consistent explanation and definition of events. The theologian knows the 
promise of resurrection, the philosopher seeks to find the truth about who 
he is and how it is that he can undergo the change of human death and still 
remain the same person. 
The medical practitioner is not a casual observer to this discussion 
because the change wrought by death turns his patient into a corpse. The 
medical practitioner is required to identify with moral certainty when this 
process has occurred. However, his function is only to recognize the 
physical changes. The meaning of those changes must be explained and 
interpreted in the light of the developing understanding of the Church, 
taught by Divine revelation and guided by its own consistency. 
The medical scientist brings to the theologian and the philosopher the 
detail of the fruits of research and observation, and thus contributes to the 
refinement and development of the Church's teaching. The Church 
analyzes technological developments in the light of the Christian concept of 
the human person, created by God's love to this image, sustained by the 
same Divine love, redeemed by Christ and called to communion with Him 
and to share in His happiness. 
The matter of defining death is therefore not only a matter for medicine 
nor only for theologians and philosophers. Medicine must accurately 
inform the latter of the new developments and assess the latter's 
explanation in the light of the phenomenon of the circumstances of human 
death and the scientific explanation of the physical events. 
The theologian and the philosopher, guided by the medical scientist, can 
describe various degrees of the breaking-up of the body. However, 
establishing with moral certainty the diagnosis of any particular state or 
degree of disintegration and disorganization is an entirely medical matter. 
The question posed by the developments in medical science which must 
be answered by the Church is: At what stage of disintegration and 
disorganization can it be said with moral certainty that the human body is 
no longer identifiable as the human person. 
When we have answered that theological and philosophical question, 
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then medical science may determine by what means of diagnosis that stage 
of disintegration and disorganization can be recognized with moral 
certainty. 
The above would therefore suggest a logical sequence: 
* Who is the human person? Who is it who is created by God's love to 
His image, sustained by God's love, redeemed by Christ and called to 
communion with Him and to share in His happiness? 
* What is meant by saying that a human death has occurred? 
* How may human death be recognized as having occurred? 
* How may the bodies of the dead be used? 
* What is required to maintain respect for the dead while using the 
bodies of the dead for organ transplantation or medical research? 
Thus the problem of defining death is resolvable in stages: the definition 
of the human person, the definition of the death of the human person, the 
medical means of determining that death has occurred , the legitimate uses 
of corpses and the pastoral issue of maintaining respect for the dead. Only 
after these problems have been resolved is it feasible to consider the issue of 
public policy and the legitimacy of so-called "brain-death" legislation. 
2. Human Life 
The definition of death must account for the change which occurs when a 
human life as we know it ceases but, according to Christian belief, at the 
same time continues with the same identity. 
A simple dualist account has no difficulty in seeing the human person as 
soul or spirit merely inhabiting a body in the same way as a captain inhabits 
and directs his ship. On that view the spiritual and material worlds are 
separate: soul is distinct from body; mind is distinct from matter.4 
On that simple dualist account, death occurs when the soul leaves the 
body, and at the beginning of life a person begins when the body is infused 
with a soul. 
However the issue is more complex. We are embodied and it is as bodies 
that we experience creation, that we love, that we know ourselves. The 
traditional teaching of the Church is of an interrelatedness of the soul and 
the body. 
The Church considers the human being both as a personal unity and as a duality of 
soul and body. the unity of soul and body is so profound that one must consider 
the soul as the "form" of the body (forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter", 
says the Council of Vienne, 1312 ... ) ... ' 
This point is clearly expressed by St. Thomas when he says, 
We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is 
the form ofthe human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of 
the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is 
primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is 
knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. 
The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts 
by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body 
lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different 
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degrees of living things. that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital 
functions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment. 
sensation. and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this 
principle by which we primarily understand. whether it be called the intellect or the 
intellectual soul. is the form of the body ... • 
It is also as a body that we are glorified .7 
... But the body - this is not meant for fornication; it is for the Lord. and the Lord 
for the body. God who raised the Lord from the dead . will by his power raise us up 
too ' 
... Your body. you know. is the temple of the Holy Spirit . who is in you since you 
received him from God. You are not your own property: you have been bought 
and paid for. That is why you should use your body for the glory of God· 
An explanation of what it is to be a human person must therefore be 
consistent with the concept of a dynamic relationship between the soul and 
the body in which the soul is the form of the body; with the continuity of an 
identity of the individual through death in which the body is no longer 
formed by a soul; and with that same soul being the form of a glorified body 
at the resurrection . 
That explanation must also be consistent with the constant teaching of 
the Church reaffirmed in the Dec/aralion on Procured Aborlion: 
From the time the ovum is fertili zed. a new life is begun which is neither that of the 
father nor of the mother. it is rather the life of a new huma n being with his own 
growth. It would never be made human if it were not human already. To this 
perpetual evidence ... modern genetic science brings valuable confirmation. It has 
demonstrated that. from the first instant. the programme is fixed as to what this 
living being will be: a man. this individual-man with his characteristic aspects 
already well determined . Right from fertilization is begun the adventure of a 
human life. and each of its great capacities requires time ... to find its place and 10 be 
in a position 10 act. ,0 
I f we understand St. Thomas then the body owes its nature to the soul. 
The completed capacities, the programming. the determination of 
development which we now know to be present at fertilization can only be 
so because there is a soul. It is the soul which gives the matter its human 
form and directs the development of a new human individual. 
Yet it is not necessary for that individual to actually instantiate 
rationality. The embryo. the fetus . the infant do not yet appear to have 
rational thoughts but they have the capacity to develop to a stage of rational 
thought. 
Upon that capacity rests the classification of a creature made in the image 
and likeness of God . Thus at fertilization a new individual is formed , matter 
is dynamically organized and integrated into a single individual with the 
capacity for rational thought . a being redeemed by Christ and called to 
communion with Him. 
3. Human Death 
The fruit of human generation is sometimes malformed and incapable of 
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demonstrate by philosophical argumentation alone. A theological ethic 
closes the gap between recognizing the good and the motivation to do the 
good. This is particularly important today when self-interest is defended 
and even exalted by those who encourage for-profit medicine, 
entrepreneurism, competition among health providers, and the com-
mercialization of every facet of medicine. Many physicians today feel 
justified ethically in laying aside their moral obligations on the grounds of 
survival and exigency. Such a position would be difficult to justify on 
grounds of Christian ethics. 
Christian theology is based in a Christian humanism that counter-
balances the predominantly consequentialist bias of contemporary medical 
ethics. This is not to deny the motives of individual consequentialists, nor 
even the applicability in certain cases of consequentialist arguments. But, in 
terms of a Christian anthropology, certain acts are intrinsically wrong 
whatever their consequences - abortion, direct voluntary or direct 
involuntary euthanasia, experimentation with the human embryo, trans-
species genetic experimentation involving human genes, surrogate 
motherhood and many of the possible permutations and combinations of 
modern reproductive technologies.23 
Ethics based in a Christian anthropology is the surest safeguard against 
the dangers inherent in the biologization of medicine discussed in the 
preceding section. It is inconsistent with treating a human being merely as 
an organism or an object for experimentation. It opposes any tendency to 
base ethics in biology whether behavioristic; sociobiological or psycho-
biological. 
Theological Ethics 
Finally, a theologically inspired medical ethics gives meaning to suffering 
- something difficult or impossible to demonstrate on philosophical 
grounds alone. Thus, it fills a void in modern medicine. It rescues death, 
dying, and suffering from the desert of "meaningless" events. Suffering on 
the Christian view is a means of atonement, reconciliation, sacrifice, and 
example. Its impact on family, friends and community is not without 
consequence. Suffering is the final call by Christ to the same via crucis He 
traversed for us, and we must traverse for Him and our fellows. The 
meanings of suffering cannot be deduced from the formal syllogisms of 
philosophic ethics. 
Theological ethics bears directly on what it is to be a healer and helper of 
the sick. It converts a health career into a vocation, a special kind oflife, and 
a way of salvation. 24 It is the health professional's special way to salvation. 
That call tempers self-interest and the normal and understandable fatigue, 
anger, resentment, and emotional distress which can accompany the 
practice of responsible medicine. It tempers, too, the hostility to the non-
compliant, self-abusing, sociopathic patients who can, at times, try the 
patience and charity of even the most conscientious physician or nurse. 
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of course not conclusive evidence of that existence. When, from empirical 
observation and the evidence of many deaths, we can conclude that a stage 
is reached where there is no evidence of any unifying organization from that 
stage, then we can say, not with absolute certainty, but at least with moral 
certainty, that the body no longer lives, the body is a corpse. 
The important feature of this account is that the human being is not to be 
taken only as ii biological unit, nor can the biological phenomenon we 
observe as a living human body be considered in isolation from that which 
forms the matter of which it is composed. An essential component of being 
a human being is our individuality as persons, not merely as biological 
entities. Most human beings are genetically unique, though not all are. 
(Identical twins are not.) Nevertheless the human soul is not to be confused 
with the body's genetic programming although the genetic programming 
would seem to be a consequence of the existence of a human soul. 
Personal individuality is much more than mere genetic identity.13 The 
latter is a biological phenomenon which does not explain the full unity of 
organization nor a spiritual identity, although its purposiveness, dynamism 
and form would seem to be indicative of a soul, that which gives form to the 
matter. 
The human person is not a duality of soul and body, mind and matter, in 
the sense in which soul and body might be said to co-exist. Our individuality 
is such that we are a unity existing as a single concrete entity. 
The soul is one with the body, forming, determining, actuating and organising the 
matter to be a human body, including a ll its tissues, organs, limbs and sexuality. 
The body is the subject for all our conscious activities and shares in the unique 
sense of dignity and value of the human being in every way.l4 
For a human being to exist in an embodied way, matter must take on the 
individuality of the soul and be organized and integrated into a single, 
dynamic entity. The humanity of that entity is in the particular form which 
is the organizing, dynamic principle of its integration as a single entity. 
Evidently the matter which at one time has the form of a particular 
individual can be restructured by or absorbed into another form. The 
matter that I am today may later be in the daisies which the cow turns into 
milk for my grandson's breakfast! 
Life has many forms , but only human life is known to be made in the 
image and likeness of God to be redeemed by Him. The tissues and organs 
which constitute the human body instantiate the particular form of the 
individual person they constitute. The life of each cell is integrated into the 
life of the whole person, not essentially by shared genetic identity, but 
because they are part of a complete, individual system which is so formed 
and activated as to be the kind of being with capacities for specifically 
human functions. 
Many ofthose cells and organs are capable of an independent life . Blood 
cells , kidneys, liver, lungs, heart, etc. , can be kept alive either in culture or in 
another body at least for a time. The life of a human cell or a human organ 
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is of moral significance in itself only insofar as it is a part of a whole. By 
contrast the life of a whole human body is of moral significance in itself, not 
because it may be a part of anything else or a member of a community. Each 
of us is separately and distinctly made in the image and likeness of God and 
individually called by Him to communion with Him. 
Thus the value of cells and organs is determined only by their integration 
into the whole body of the human individual, even though they may live 
after they have been separated from the human body. The soul is 
instantiated by the body as a functioning unity, by the organs, tissues, cells 
collectively when they function as a single body, each related to the other 
parts of the whole and contributing to the dynamism of the whole. 
Medical science, in its study of the human person, sees in the human body 
a variety of interrelated, mutually dependent systems (circulatory, 
respiratory, hormonal, skeletal, neural, digestive, etc.). At the earliest stages 
of existence, the human person is yet to develop these systems, but what he 
or she has is the capacity to develop them. From the earliest stage of 
embryonic development, however, the same organizing, dynamizing, 
integrating principle or form exists, shaping what is to come and directing 
the activity of what is. 
The important feature of a human existence, therefore, is not the 
biological systems themselves which constitute the human body, but the 
principle or form of which the biological systems and their capacity at every 
stage are the instantiation. 
Death occurs therefore when the biological systems which constitute the 
human body cease to be integrated, dynamized and organized by the life 
principle or form which is the human soul. The individual systems may live 
as live tissues, and even retain the structures given them by the human soul, 
long after the soul has ceased to provide them with the dynamism, 
organization and integration which once gave those tissues the capacity for 
human functions as a psychosomatic unity. 
Death of the human person is thus not necessarily the death of individ ual 
cells, nor the death of particular organs and systems; rather it is the loss of 
the organization and integration which give a body its human capacities. 
However death is defined , in observing death all we ever have evidence 
for is an absence of observable functions . Lack of capacity for human 
functions is assumed. It cannot be proven. No one has ever seen a headless 
corpse sign its name. It would seem to lack the capacity ever to be able to 
sign its name again. The lack of capacity cannot itself be observed , however. 
Only the lack of the function itself can be observed. 
The determination of death is based upon induction. There are 
conditions of the human body from which state no body has ever been 
known to recover or attain specifically human functions. 
Inductive logic has in some circumstances led to error. Historically, upon 
the observation of an absence of vital signs, persons have been pronounced 
dead only to recover. Some conditions, such as hypothermia, for instance, 
may have suppressed vital signs even though there still exists a capacity for 
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recovery. Fear of being buried alive was a common phenomenon of the 19th 
century. Coffins were sometimes made with bells which could be rung from 
the inside or spring-loaded lids which could be released from the inside. ls 
The soul is not a measurable observable substance. Where there are 
human functions we can presume that the soul exists as the life principle , 
but where human functions are not apparent, we cannot draw certain 
cortclusions. However, inductive logic, ready to be corrected by experience , 
is sufficient for moral certainty. Where no indication of the capacity for 
specifically human functions has ever been known to exist we may 
legitimately conclude that no human individual exists. When a stage is 
reached at which there is a history of empirical evidence that from the stage 
no organization and integration necessary for specifically human functions 
had ever reappeared , we can conclude that death has occurred . 
In an essay in which he attacks the determination of death using the 
brain-death criteria , Josef Seifert makes the following observation: 
If we prescind from those deepest dimensions of human life which are inseparable 
from his transcendence . however important these may be for a comprehensive 
discussion of life a nd death. we can say that the question of human life and death . 
as it enters the bioethical discussion and the examination of the criterion of brain 
death. moves primarily on two levels . On the one hand . we may indeed. on the 
philosophical ground of recognising the spiritual substantiality of the human soul. 
define death as 'the separation of body and soul.' It could be understood as a 
gradual temporal process in which this separation,is accomplished or as the last 
and definitive moment in which the spiritual subject which is necessari ly 
presupposed. above and beyond the brain . for conscious and intellectual acts of 
man is no longer bound to the body, does no longer vivify the body. is no longer 
present in it. Some of those who recognise the existence of a soul will believe that it 
is annihilated in death (as the whole death-theology assumes). others that it is 
immortal and still continues to exist after the death of the body. (To this view 
corresponds the conviction of another kind of life after death - either in a 
no n-incarnated sp iritual form or in a new embodied form.) At any rate, if we can 
know philosophically that man must ha ve a soul, we must also maintain as 
philosophers . with Plato's Phaidon and the ensuing tradition , that the human 
personal life on earth objectively begins when the spiritual human soul enters into. 
and is present in. the human body. that it continues as long as the soul is united 
with the body, and that our bodily early life objectively ends at the moment whtn 
the human soul leaves definitively the body.'6 
I find the notion of a sou l entering into, being present in, the human 
body, and leaving it at death , to be an incoherent notion because I cannot 
understand how a human body can be in existence at all unless it has been 
formed by a soul. The soul does not "enter into" the human body; the soul is 
that which forms ' matter into a body, which vitalizes it, which gives it its 
capacities for development as a human body. The human body as a living 
entity is formed by the soul giving human life to mere matter. I concur with 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith when it asks (rhetorically) in 
relation to the first appearance of a human life in the form of an 
embryo" ... how could a human individual not be a human person?"1 7 
How can there be a living human body which is distinct from its soul? The 
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body only comes into existence when it is the instantiation of a human soul. 
There can be no human organization, integration and dynamism unless 
there is a life-principle, a soul to form, determine, actuate and organize the 
matter to be a human body. 
Seifert's dualism is too simplistic. The relationship between matter and 
form which exists in the embodiment of the human individual is a unity in 
which the soul is the form of the body and the latter cannot be as a single 
dynamic, integrated organized entity without that which makes it so. The 
human body without a soul is not a living human individual at all for it lacks 
the unity, the integration and the organization that the soul provides. 
A human life comes into existence when a soul gives form to matter and 
matter assumes the bodily identity of a being which is organized as a single 
individual oriented toward the development of specifically human 
functions such as wondering, doubting, affirming, loving, etc. That life is 
entirely dependent upon the continued dynamic interaction between matter 
and form. 
A human life ends not when the soul leaves the body, for that expression 
is incoherent. The body is matter instantiating the soul. A human life ends 
when the matter, the tissues, organs, etc., which constitute the body, cease 
to have an organizing integrating principle, that is, when the soul ceases to 
give human form to the matter. 
When that event occurs individual cells, organs and bodily systems may 
continue to have a life of their own but only in a disintegrated way for 
nothing actuates them as a single dynamic entity with capacities for 
specifically human functions . I concur with Professor Seifert when he says: 
"As long as the integrated d ynamic structure of the biological human life of 
a human organism as a whole is present, we must assume, at least as highly 
probable, that his personal human life is present toO."18 
There is , however, a difference between the dynamic interactions of 
matter and form which is a living human individual , and the human 
organism whose organs keep functioning and interacting in a merely 
systemic way without the dynamic and ongoing integration of some form of 
control of the system as a whole . The essential dynamic organization and 
integration which constitute a living human body are far more than the 
bio-mechanical interaction of organs within the body. 
An analogy exists between a conceptus which is so damaged that it lacks 
the organizing capacity to ever develop the organs necessary for human 
functions on the one hand , and on the other, an adult who is so damaged by 
disease or trauma that that which brings about organization and 
integration does not and never will funct ion again. In the latter case the 
organs will have been formed and function and interact in a residual way, 
but the organizing capacity which brought about their growth and 
development and determined their form and function no longer exists. Such 
a being, like the undifferentiated cluster of cells of the malformed 
conceptus , is human only in the loose sense of genetic identity. It is without 
overall organization. The body has living cells and organs but is not a living 
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human body in the important sense of being human, that is, having the 
capacity for human functions. . 
Hence it would be possible for death (that is the loss of the organizing and 
integrating formation of matter by the soul) to have occurred even though 
some organs still functioned and interacted in a systemic way. Residual 
function of that kind might well persist even though the capacities which 
brought about the development and establishment of these organs and their 
interactive functions has ceased to inform the matter of which they are 
constituted. That the organs might continue for a time in this way is no 
more a problem for determining death than is the fact that individual cells 
may live long after a body has started to putrify. Many cells continue to 
grow and replicate such as finger nails and hair, bacteria in the gut thrive, 
and corneas and bone may be transplanted to another as living tissue even 
though circulation and respiration have ceased . 
The issue at the heart of the matter is which parts of the whole are 
necessary for the whole to retain the ongoing capacity for organization and 
integration as a human individual. 
This is primarily a question for medical science, but theologians and 
philosophers must measure the medical answers against a metaphysical 
explanation of the human person. It must not be the case that medicine 
adopts a reductionist, materialist concept of the human person, nor an 
overly simplistic dualism. Pope Pius XII concluded, in 1957: 
Human life continues for as long as its vital functions, distinguished from the 
simple life (biologic) of the organs, manifest themselves spontaneously witho ut the 
help of artificial processes. The task of determining the exact instant of death is 
that of the physician. 19 
Evidently the Pope accepted a distinction between the life of the organs 
and the life of the individuial. What he meant by "vita l functions", of course, 
remains unclear. The state of the technology has altered dramatically since 
1957. Many people are able to live for long periods with their vital functions 
sustained by art ificial processes. People who live relatively active lives on 
ventilators and dialysis machines are instances of this. Whether this is what 
the Pope meant when he referred to vitalfunctions manifesting themselves 
spontaneously is unclear. There is a sense in which "vital functions" may be 
used in which the term refers not to bodily functions such as circulation, 
respiration, etc., but to the specific functions which identify and express a 
human nature. 
4. The Determination of Death 
a) Heart-Lung Death 
In the past there has been little question that when the heart stopped 
beating and breathing ceased permanently, a person was dead. However, as 
a matter of pastoral practice, the sacraments were sometimes administered 
as much as two hours after cessation of cardio-respiratory function, even 
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though Canon Law did not permit the sacraments to be given to those who 
were known to be dead.20 By implication some doubt must have existed as 
to the certainty of death even when heart and lung function had 
permanently ceased . 
The relevance of h~art-lung death is not the cessation of the function of 
the orga ns themselves . People do continue to live with artificial hearts , or 
with transplanted hearts and lungs even though their own hearts and lungs 
have died . What is relevant is the dependence of nearly all the body's organs 
and systems on circulation and respiration. Irretrievable cardio-respiratory 
arrest clearly indicates a lack of organization and integration. Of course for 
a time the organs remain in place with their structure still extant, some 
tissues even grow and certainly many of the cells remain in some sense alive. 
However, no indication exists for the presence of a life principle. There is no 
evidence of on-going organization and integration, for the organs and 
tissues rapidly deteriorate and we know empirically that bodies do not 
recover human functions after a significant period of cardio-respiratory 
arrest. 
The importance of irreversible cardio-respiratory arrest as a marker 
event for determining death is not that we have reduced our concept of 
human life to heart and lung function, but rather that empirically we have 
seen no evidence of anyon-going process of organizations and integration 
beyond the point at which such arrests occur. We cannot prove that the soul 
of a person whose body is in irreversible cardio~respiratory arrest no longer 
forms the matter of which the body is composed . Nevertheless after that 
stage, the disintegration and decomposition which normally occur (that is, 
when nothing is done to preserve the tissues) would indicate that the soul no 
longer forms , actuates or dynamizes the matter into a functioning human 
body. 
b) Complete Death of the Brain and Brain Stem 
The ability to sustain ventilation, and to control blood pressure, 
temperature and electrolyte balances artificially has made the continued 
functioning of most of the body's systems possible even after the complete 
and irreversible cessation of all brain and brain stem functions. 
The term "brain death" is inappropriate and means different things to 
different people. It is inappropriate because it confuses the issue. The issue 
is not whether the brain , as an organ, is alive or dead, but whether the 
human individual is dead . That the term "brain death" means different 
things to different people is most clearly demonstrated by Professor Seifert 
when he writes: 
Yet does it follow that the brain dead ma n is dead as ma n? Does it follow tha t 
growth , metabolism. oxygen acceptance and transfer, most co mplex biologica l 
steering of pregnancies, regeneratio n of any part of the body, production of new 
reproducti ve cells, etc . can occur in an orga n-bank? Is thi s bran dead man trul y a 
"living corpse"? Hardly . 
... Now as long as growth of the body as a whole is possible, as in children wh o a re 
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declared brain dead, one of the fundamental traces of the life of an organism as a 
whole is still preserved . 
The same applies to nutrition and regeneration and maintenance of the body 
through the circulation of oxygen, to nourishment and heart activity. As long as 
the process of nutrition and circulation in the "body as a whole" is preserved , even 
if one or another single organ is not functioning , the life of the human organism as 
a whole cannot be justifably denied . 
Even if the mere continued existence of human sperms, and therefore of 
procreative functions , is no proof that a human person is alive (which is obvious 
for the fact that sperms can also be preserved , under refrigeration , after the death 
of a person) , as long as a human organism produces new procreative cells and is in 
principle capable of being the origin of the procreation of new human beings , a 
profound vital function is still intact which must not be ascribed to a corpse. A 
corpse cannot procreate itself. How should it be possible that a corpse still 
produced reproductive cells and is capable of the amazing power of giving rise to a 
new individual of the same species? Certainly, even if it were conceivable that an 
isolated sexual organ is kept alive and continues to produce gametes, it would not 
possess the life of a man . Yet we have to consider an extremely important factor for 
the determination of human biological life: its ' integrated wholeness'. 
It can well be argued that brain dead persons are alive in virtue of the organ 
activity and the integrated wholeness of life processes which are associated with 
blood and oxygen circulation. As the human body as a whole is kept from 
disintegrating, from putrefaction, from collapsing into mere inorganic substances, 
as the body-temperature and the processes that are conditions of it, and a number 
of other signs of life are still preserved throughout the organism, it seems to be 
wrong to declare such a person in irreversible coma dead. There is no sound and 
certainly no cogent justification for this ." . 
In these assertions Professor Seifert clearly indicates that in the state he 
refers to as "brain death" the human individual is able: 
a) to grow (if a child) 
b) to maintain its own metabolism 
c) to maintain its own oxygen acceptance and transfer 
d) to maintain most complex biological steering of pregnancies 
e) to regenerate any part of the body 
f) to produce new reproductive cells 
g) to maintain nutrition 
These are not features of a body in which all brain and brain stem activity 
has permanently ceased. 22 
36 
The growth of a child is hormonally controlled by the release of growth 
hormones from the glands located at the base of the brain. These glands do not 
function in a body which has no brain and no brain stem function . 
The metabolism, blood pressure and body temperature in a body which has no 
brain and no brain stem function must be supported artificially. The vaso-motor 
cent re. for instance, is located in the brain stem and it normally maintains tone in 
the blood vessels. Without a functioning brain stem the body cannot itself 
maintain metabolic balance, blood pressure and temperature. 
Oxygen acceptance and transfer. that is respiration, is done through the means 
of a n artificial ventilator for the respiratory centre is located in the brain stem and 
hence does not function in a body whose brain and brain stem have ceased to 
function. The ti ssues of the lung and the blood cells operate and accept and 
tra nsfer oxygen supplied through the mechanically ventilated lungs. 
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Without brain and brain stem function the bod y cannot itself maintain the 'most 
complex bio logical steering of pregnancies'. The deve lopment of a pregnancy is 
not controlled by the woman's body. The control of a pregnancy in even a health y 
woman comes not from her but from the fetus and its placenta. The ho rmones 
which bring about the specific changes necessary during pregnancy are produced 
by the fetus and its placenta. Further. the woman's own hormonal control system 
is located at the base of her brain and d oes not function if she has no brain and no 
brain stem function . 
The production of new reproductive cells is controlled by the hormones released 
by the glands located at the base of the brain. Hence in a body which has no brain 
and no brain stem function no new reproductive cells would be produced. 
Nutrition for a body without brain and brain stem function must be provided by 
artificial means. Digestive and renal function may still occur because these do not 
necessarily require brain function . although electrolyte and other meta bolic 
imbalances occur in the absence of the brain and bra in stem function. 
Complete and irreversible cessation of brain and brain stem function is 
not a condition in which a body can persist indefinitely. Cardiac function 
ceases in the majority of cases within 24 horus and , in a large study 
involving 500 cases, all went into cardiac arrest within nine days23 
Brain death is a state beyond coma and was first characterized "by 
complete unresponsivity, lack of spontaneous respiration , flaccidity, 
altered thermal regulation, absence of mesencephalic reflexes and 
circulatory collapse."24 
The condition which Professor Seifert describes is not what is usually 
meant by "brain death" in Australia and North America and many other 
regions. Rather, the state he describes is a living state between life and death 
sometimes referred to as "permanently lost consciousness" or less 
sensitively as a "persistent vegetative state".25 
Brain death , meaning the complete and irreversible cessation of all brain 
and brain stem function, is not a state of equilibrium. The organs and 
tissues are being damaged by the lack of control and the resultant systemic 
imbalances. The preservation of some systemic function is due to the 
artificial intervention provided and the functioning of organs which are not 
directly dependent on the brain and brain stem. The body is already in a 
state of disintegration; it has no signs of ongoing organization. The 
functions which are left are a remnant of the organizing capacity of the 
individual's psychosomatic unity. There is no dynamism. We see only a 
collection of organs still interacting and functioning but without the 
directed ness, the actuating organizing potency which brings abou the unity 
of matter and form we recognize as a human individual. The pathological 
evidence shows that the brain tissue of a body with whole brain death has 
necrosed . There is a cessation of blood flow to the brain. The state of the 
body is akin to that of a body which has been guillotined .26 
Like the complete and irreversible cessation of heart and lung function , 
the complete and irreversible cessation of brain and brain stem function is a 
state byond which there is no evidence of any body ever recovering any 
ongoing process of organization and integration. 
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The partial preservation of organ and systemic function which occurs 
when all brain and brain stem function has ceased does not indicate any 
on-going organization and integration. Hence the complete and irreversible 
cessation of brain and brain stem function is a sufficient marker event for a 
diagnosis of death to be made with all the implications that death of an 
individual has for the family and for the society. 
Hence the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical Research would seem to have been correct when 
it drew the following conclusions: 
On this view. death is that moment at which the body's physiological system 
ceases to constitute an integrated whole 21 
Nor is there one single characteristic (e .g. breathing. yawning, etc.) the loss of 
which signifies death. Rather, what is missing in the dead is a cluster of attributes , 
all of which form part of an organism's responsiveness to its internal and external 
environment28 
The death of a human being - not the "death" of cells , tissues or organs - is the 
matter at issue. The cessation of vital bodily systems provides the basis for broad 
standards by which death can be judged to have occurred. But such functional 
cessation is not of interest in and for itself, but for what it reveals about the status of 
the person. What was formerly a person is now a dead body and can be socially and 
legally treated as such . Although absence of breathing and heartbeat may often 
have been spoken of as "defining" death , review of history and of current medical 
and popular understanding makes clear that these were merely evidence for the 
disintegration of the organism as a whole 29 
The modern recourse to the complete and irreversible cessation of brain 
and brain stem function would seem to be appropriate in circumstances in 
which cardio-respiratory arrest is prevented by artificial means and the 
cessation of all brain and brain-stem function is established by appropriate 
testing by a physician who makes the diagnosis with reasonable certainty. 
There is a variety of ways in which the diagnosis is made. These have 
improved and become less complex and more certain as science has 
developed. It is not our concern here to analyze what is a very exacting area 
of medicine. We do not need to be neurophysiologists to understand the 
moral and legal problem. Suffice it to say that we require competent 
physicians to make a careful diagnosis that it is a reasonable certainty that 
all brain and brain stem functions have permanently ceased. 
At St. Vincent's Hospital in Melbourne the diagnosis of death according 
to the brain criteria is made by an intensive care physician and a 
neurologist, each acting independently. Dr. Ed Byrne, the senior 
neurologist at St. Vincent's writes: 
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The patient must be deeply comatose with no suspicion that this state is due to 
depressant drugs. This may require pharmacological tests with drug level screens 
in patients who present to Hospital in coma. 
Hypothermia must be excluded. A body temperature of less than thirty-five 
degrees can lead to depression of brains tern reflexes and the patient's temperature 
must be raised above that level before any further testing is carried out. Metabolic 
and endocrine disturbances which can either be responsible or contribute to coma 
must be excluded. 
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The patient must be artificially ventilated because spontaneous respiration has 
been inadequate or ceased, and relaxant drugs should have been excluded as a 
cause of respiratory failure. Finally, the diagnosis of a disorder which can lead to 
brain death must have been fully established and must be of sufficient severity to 
account for the clinical findings. A diagnosis of brain death cannot be considered if 
the aetiology is in doubt. 
The following confirmatory tests are then recommended. Firstly, all brainstem 
reflexes are absent. Pupillary responses, corneal responses, gag reflex , vestibulo-
ocular and oculo-cephalic responses must be absent. The patient must be 
unresponsive to all stimuli. No respiratory movements must be visible when the 
patient is disconnected from the mechanical ventilator for long enough to ensure 
that the arterial CO, tension rises above the stimulatory threshold. The procedure 
for establishing apnoea is rigorously laid down. The patient must be preventilated 
with one hundred percent oxygen for ten minutes and the PaCO, checked to 
ensure that it is above 40 mms before the ventilator is disconnected. One hundred 
percent oxygen at 6 L j min. must be supplied through a nasal tube during the 
period of disconnection from the ventilator to prevent hypoxia. The patient should 
be disconnected for approximately ten minutes and the arteria l blood gases ideally 
checked at the end of that time to ensure the CO, tension has risen beyond the 
stimulatory threshold , arbitrarily taken as 50 mms. 
The British criteria do not specify the interval between repetition of testing. If a 
massive cerebral haemorrhage, or severe head injury has occurred and remedial 
factors have been excluded, a few hours' interval suffices. In the event of a hypoxic 
event such as cardiac arrest with resuscitation , at least a day must elapse before 
tests are repeated. 
The integrity or otherwise of the spinal reflexes is recognised correctly as 
irrelevant in these criteria. Confirmatory investigations are not necessary and an 
expert neurological opinion is not regarded as essential. The British criteria are 
now widely accepted in Australia , and form the basis of the establishment of brain 
death in this Hospital. Essentially similar criteria have now been recommended by 
the President's Committee on Ethical Problems in Medicine in the United States of 
America, with the exception that the role of the electro-encephalogram is left open. 
The validity of these criteria was recently challenged in a widely publicised 
Panorama programme in the United Kingdom with the result that there was a loss 
of public confidence and a massive fall in the number of renal donors. The fear that 
a patient still alive but paralysed could be inadvertently disconnected from a 
ventilator is a real one in the public mind which can readily be played upon by 
sensationalism. None of the cases mentioned in the Panorama programme even 
remotely fulfilled the clinical criteria for brain death, but the public furore caused 
the medical profession to critically validate the criteria adopted. 
Brain death criteria can be validated in two ways. The first is to demonstrate that 
brain death invriably leads to classical death within a short period, that is, the heart 
stops in spite of every possible supportive treatment. Over a thousand cases who 
fu lfilled British Brain Death Criteria have now been ventilated until they 
developed cardiac asysto le. In the great majority the heart stopped within a few 
days and in all cases spontaneous asystole followed diagnosis of brain death within 
a relatively short period. 
It is impossible to maintain an adequate circulation indefinitely in the presence 
of a destroyed brainstem. The longest study followed three hundred and twenty-
six patients diagnosed as being brain dead who were treated intensively after the 
diagnosis was made. The mean interval on the venti lator prior to spontaneous 
cardiac arres t was only thirty hours. The same group looked at all patients with 
very severe head injuries who surv ived, and found that none had ever met the 
criteria for brain death. It is worth making the point that many patients developed 
cardiac asystole while the determination of brain death is in progress, especially 
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if circumstances dictate a long interval of observation. It can be said with certainty, 
therefore, that in any given case, fulfilment of the rigorous clinical criteria 
recommended by the British Royal Colleges predicates the irreversible 
development of cardiac asystole in the near future. 
The second route to verification of the brain death criteria is the pathological 
one. If it can be shown that fulfilment of a set of criteria correlates with confluent 
necrosis of the br';in at autopsy in all cases, then the criteria are validated. 
Mohandes and Chriv, two Minnesota neurosurgeons, studied twenty-five patients 
who fulfilled a clinical brain death protocol similar to the British one, and found 
that all cases had confluent cerebral necrosis. A larger American collaborative 
study, however, concluded that no subset of clinical criteria or specific time for 
persistence of the totally non-functional state invariably correlates with 
pathological evidence of a 10lally destroyed brain. This is not unexpected as 
occasional islands of surviving neurones may presumably be found in a situation 
where the mass of the brain has been destroyed , but these have no functional 
significance. Furthermore, in studies where patients have been ventilated to 
asystole, many have developed cardiac asystole before neuropathological changes 
have had time to develop. It can be said with confidence, however , that all patients 
who have developed clinical evidence of brain death and have maintained 
rhythmic circulation long enough for neuropathological changes to appear, have 
had evidence of massive irreversible brain destruction . 
The clinical criteria of brain death suggested by the Royal Colleges have, 
therefore, been fully validated by establishing an exact correlation with cardiac 
asystole in patients in whom ventilation is continued and by, as far as is possible , 
demonstrating neuropathological evidence of severe brain destruction.'o 
c) Permanently Lost Consciousness 
Permanently lost consciousness denotes a condition between life and death . Such 
individuals are not brain dead nor able to return to a cognizant life. There is severe 
neurologic dysfunction with only minimally persisting brain activity. These 
conditions must be excluded from certain medullopontine lesions causing the 
so-called locked-in syndrome, or cerebromedullospinal disconnection. In the 
latter condition some mental awareness may be preserved and significant cranial 
nerve dysfunction exists but voluntary muscle movements are absent .'1 
Patients in this category (permanently lost consciousness) after a few 
weeks become arousable but are unconscious. All higher functions are 
absent. They cannot speak, make voluntary movements, exhibit emotions, 
or have a memory. They do breathe spontaneously but their responses to 
stimuli are primitive only. There is a range of conditions which fall into this 
category including so-called persistent vegetative states, (apallic state, coma 
vigil, etc.) coma after brain injury or hypoxia with brain-stem function, very 
rare cases of end-stage degenerative brain disease (e.g. , Alzheimer's 
disease), intra-cranial mass lesions, and anencephaly (congenital brain 
hypoplasia).32 
These patients apparently lack those functions which are specifically 
human functions even though they possess ongoing dynamic organization. 
In spite of that organization, they do not function in any observably human 
way as individuals. They appear to have no significant cortical or higher 
brain activity. Many have been tempted therefore to reduce the criteria for 
establishing death to complete cessation of cortical activity even when 
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some brain stem function still exists. 
Lorna Linda University in California approved a research protocol in 
December, 1987 which had the title "Modified Medical Management on 
Anencephalic Infants for Organ Donation."33 The Lorna Linda experiment 
intensified the debate in which some are calling for the use of anencephalic 
infants as a source of organs for transplant purposes. 
From the point of view of those who would wish to utilize anencephalic 
infants, the problem is that anencephalic infants who are born alive with 
usable organs are not born brain dead; they have some brain stem function. 
The structural anomalies of the brain stem in infants diagnosed as 
anencephalic varies from severe to relatively mild and there is a 
corresponding level of dysfunction .34 The removal of organs from 
anencephalic infants would, in the eyes of the law, be the removal of the 
organs from living persons and hence, be battery, if not murder. 
The options for using anencephalics as donors include: waiting for 
traditional death, redefining death as cortical death, defining anencephaly 
as a special category or abandoning the rule that donors must be dead 
before organs are removed. 
The Lorna Linda experiment in the first instance involved keeping 
anencephalic infants on a ventilator until brain death occurred. However, a 
difficulty arose with the protocol in that anencephalic infants on ventilators 
actually did fairly well and their condition improved so that brain death did 
not eventuate within the time scale first thought. The protocol was 
subsequently modified on 15 April 1988 so that ventilation was not 
commenced until the infant went into cardiac-respiratory failure . .l5 In that 
way, presumably it was hoped that brain death would be more likely to 
occur. That anencephalic infants proved to be so viable increased the 
pressure for a change to the definition of death . 
It is argued that having made the step to using the whole brain death 
criterion, it is but a small step to using the cortical death criterion. In fact. 
the logic employed by the Harvard Committee3" which originally canvassed 
the brain death criterion would seem to be that of utility which could easily 
be extended to anencephaly, advanced Alzheimer's disease and the other 
conditions of permanently lost consciousness: 
The Committee was explicit as to its utilitarian moti ve: 'Our primary purpose.' 
they began. 'is to define irreversible coma as a new criterion for death.' because. 
they went on to say. 'obsolete criteria for the new definition of death can lead to 
cont roversy is obtaini ng organs for tra nspla ntation.' If reso lution of a controversy 
that stand s in th e way was a valid reason for redefining dea th in 1968. why would it 
not be a sufficient reason for another definition in 1988')·17 
The obvious point to make is that this implies that the definition of death 
is determined not by anything which is intrinsic to persons or their corpses, 
but according to the uses which may be found . To the contrary, death must 
be defined in metaphysical terms. Identifying the events which mark it is a 
matter of truth, not utility. 
Another proposal is to establish a special category for anencephalics. 
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Michael Harrison suggests the phrase "brain absent".38 However, this 
would simply be a variation on the theme of altering the concept of brain 
death . Such infants would be treated as though brain dead and the phrase 
would thus have the same implications. 
Finally, Norman FosP9 suggests the possibility of abandoning the rule 
that "donors" must be dead . The idea would be to limit the removal of 
organs to those patients, such as anencephalics who were not capable of 
consciously experiencing harm and who were not capable of having the 
capacity for such consciousness restored . The limits could perhaps be 
extended to include those with advanced stages of Alzheimer's disease, etc. 
The fundamental issue in all of this is the failure to reach agreement on a 
definition of human life. However, that failure should not therefore simply 
open the way for a utilitarian assignment of a definition for no relevant 
reason to do with those declared to be dead, but according to the need for 
organs. 
On the other hand, the whole brain death criteria, not as a re-defining of 
death, but as a more precise way of identifying the disintegration and 
disorganization which is the cessation of a human life, is acceptable. 
However, much as it may be of great advantage to be able to use organs 
from the persistently comatose but not brain dead, including anencephalics, 
they remain at least worthy of the benefit of any doubt concerning their 
human identity, for they clearly have a degree of integration and 
organization. Their bodily systems are subject to central control even 
though the nature of the organization present is apparently not sufficient 
for them to achieve higher levels of human functions. They are dying but 
not dead and warrant the respect we normally accord the dying. 
5. Respect for the Bodies of the Dead 
Pope Pius XII in 1956 gave his approval to cadaveric organ donations 
saying: 
A person may will to dispose of his body and to destine it to ends that are useful , 
morally irreproachable and even noble, among them the decision to aid the sick 
and suffering. One may make a decision of this nature with respect to his own body 
with full realization of the reverence which is due to it. .. this decision should not be 
condemned but positively justified 40 
The general principles which apply to the use of cadaveric tissue are: 
a) There must be moral certainty that death has occurred. 
b) Either the donor must have 'willed' either verbally or in written form 
that the tissue might be used for this purpose, or in the absence of the 
donor's 'will', his or her relative or close friend expresses the view that the 
donor would have been prepared to donate the tissue had the question been 
put to him or her. 
c) The donation is not opposed by the relatives. 
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d) The tissues are not treated in a way which is disrespectful of the dead 
person. 
6. A Critique of Organ Transplantation 
6.1 Sentiment vs. Utility 
Most people working within health care do not object on moral grounds 
to the brain criteria for death and the donation and transplantation of 
organs from such cadavers, and approximately two thirds of the relatives 
are willing to consent to organ donation,41 yet assisting in organ 
procurement surgery remains unpopular with operating room nurses, 
ranking alongside induced abortion in unpopularity.42 Further, although 
nurses are, in general, critical of the medical profession , the surgeons who 
undertake organ procurement seem to be the objects of an unusual amount 
of criticism from nurses, often being described as "fast", "aggressive", 
" rude", "insensitive", "arrogant", etc. 
The latter may be due to the "flying squad" character of procurement 
teams, the depersonalizing character of a national register, the fact that the 
surgeon has usually been called in without prior notice to do the operation, 
the haste to collect organs for use in a patient who has been prepared to 
receive the organ, the fact that the recipient is often in another hospital and 
unknown to the nurses at the salvaging hospital, and so on, but it may also 
reflect some dehumanizi ng features of the work of organ sa lvage itself 
which is then manifested either in the personalities of surgeons involved in 
organ salvage or in the negative feelings on the part of the nurses to the work 
being done, in spite of the fact that organ harvesting is ultimately 
life-saving. 
Nursing attitudes to a procedure and the relationships between nurses 
a nd surgeons are not normally proposed as the substance of a moral 
argument. However, in the case of cadaveric organ harvesting, moral 
argument has been based upon resolving conflicts between sentiment in 
relation to the treatment of the bodies of the dead , on the one hand , and the 
utility of using the bodies of the dead to save the lives of the living , on the 
other. The effect of organ sa lvage on those who undertake the procedures. 
the emotive symbolism involved, and whether organ sa lvage is 
dehumanizing. were matters of concern in the ethical debates which led to 
the adoption of current policies. The resolution of the conflicts in favor of 
cadaveric organ transplantat ion and the passing of legislation enabling it in 
most Australian states occurred largely on the basis of the priority of the 
needs of the living over sentiment and sensitivity for the bodies of the dead. 
Now. several years after widespread acceptance and adoption of the 
practices of determining death by the brain criteria and organ salvaging, is 
an appropriate time to review the current situation. 
6.2 The Needfor Symbolism 
In his essay "The Moral Trap of Sentimentality: The Mistreatment of 
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Dead Bodies"43 Joel Feinberg discussed three major arguments defended by 
William May44 based on sentiment or sensitivity: the argument that the 
offended sentiment is essential to our humanity, the argument from 
institutional symbolism and the argument that the threatened sensibility 
has great utility. Reflection on those old arguments in the light of current 
practices leads me to the view that there is a need for symbolism and ritual in 
order to direct the sensitivities offended by organ salvage and the whole 
brain criteria for determining death in such as way as to prevent the 
hardening and coarsening of the attitudes of those routinely involved in 
organ salvage and to assist in the grieving of relatives. 
In 1972 William May argued that there is a connection between human 
dignity and a capacity for horror, and he re-affirmed that view in 1985. 
The cadaver is a kind of shroud that masks rather than expresses the soul that 
once animated it. Yet while the body retains a recognizable form , even in death , it 
commands the respect of identity. No longer a human presence, it still reminds us 
of that presence that once was utterly inseparable from it. 
.. . Proposals .. .for the dismemberment of the corpse, even if that dismemberment 
serves important social purposes such as organ transplants, awaken a deep-going 
reservation . This reservation grows out of an aversion, a shuddering, before the 
harsh treatment of a corpse 4 S 
May does not however argue that the sense of horror and the deep 
reservation one naturally has in relation to the dismemberment of a corpse 
should outweigh the benefits to be attained by organ transplantation. He 
agrees with Feinberg46 in holding that such sentiments should be disciplined 
and directed .47 
The problem is not so much whether to undertake organ salvage but the 
manner in which it occurs and the disciplining and direction of natural 
sentiments such that involvement in the activity is not dehumanizing. The 
negative attitude of operating room nurses to organ salvage and the 
surgeons who undertake it rings alarm bells in relation to the manner of 
collecting organs and the treatment of the sensitivities of those involved. 
This concern is not confined to nursing and medical staff. Being present 
at the moment of death and being with the body immediately after death are 
significant happenings in the course of a relative's grief and are of great 
emotional consequence in the personal acceptance of the loss. 
The circumstances of beating heart organ salvage deprive relatives of the 
normal opportunity to see the body at rest after the battle for life is over. 
The final chapter when respiration is ceased and the heart stops beating 
happens in the secret and often bizarre realm of the operating room while or 
just after organs are removed. Although it is true that death has occurred 
when the brain completely and irreversibly ceases to function , death by 
brain criteria alone convinces only at a rational level. While a relative or 
spouse breathes and the heart beats, it is difficult to relinquish emotional 
hold on a body which appears so alive, however convincing the evidence of 
complete and irreversible cessation of brain function. The relatives of a 
beating heart donor make their farewells not to the still remains lying in 
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the curiously peaceful repose of death, but to a departing trolley with its 
dead but breathing offering animated, so to speak, by the technology. 
Once through the opaque swinging doors of the operating room, the 
atmosphere is very different. For there the procurement team carries out 
business as usual , all action and controlled hurry against a background of 
the exchange of stories of the week-end away and the doings of teenage kids. 
Later the dissected and depleted remains will be wheeled unseen to the 
mortuary for disposal by the undertaker. 
What is missing in all of this is the ritual and symbolsim by which we 
normally humanize death . Death in this case is not the dramatic event of the 
cessation of respiration, but a doctor's diagnosis and his signing of a form. 
The release of the beating heart body to the procurement team is 
accompanied by neither ceremony nor ritual and the members of the team 
remain faceless , as though like scavenging ghouls hidden in the anonymity 
and secrecy of the operating room awaiting the rattle of the trolley and its 
human package of precious organs. 
Organ salvage for the purposes of transplantation is of great benefit to 
individuals suffering from illnesses which can be treated in this way. Renal 
transplantation, for instance , is considered the optimal treatment for 
patients with end stage renal disease because it provides better levels of 
health and well-being and a greater likelihood of enabling successful 
employment. It is also the least expensive , since the cost of maintaining 
transplanted patients is only one-third that of the cheapest form of 
dialysis. 48 
The lives of the living are more important than horror and revulsion , and 
emotion, grief and sentiment for the dead . Consequently, organ salvage 
should not be foregone simply because it makes grief more difficult and is 
contrary to sensitivities and sentiments in relation to respect for the bodies 
of the dead. 
Rather, the problem is the tendency of current practices to dehumanize 
the process. There are strong feelings and emotions at stake which need to 
be recognized and directed. 
In this respect , the churches have been extraordinarily remiss . At an 
official level, the churches have largely ignored the development of organ 
salvage from beating heart cadavers . The practice has neither been accepted 
nor rejected , and no ceremonies have been developed to mark the 
significant event which occurs when a family consents to donation. There 
are not special prayers, no liturgies, no rituals by which to direct the 
emotion energy toward recognizing and understanding the symbolism of 
the gift of organs so that another may have life , nor a religious event to mark 
the acceptance of the death of a relative. 
There is, in this reality, a challenge to the churches to explore the concept 
of institutionalized symbolism in relation to cadaveric organ donation. 
This is also a challenge to hospitals to review the practice of organ salvage 
in order to humanize it. Perhaps the procurement team should meet with 
the relatives of the donor. Perhaps a representative of the relatives of the 
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donor should be permitted to accompany the body to the operating room 
should he or she wish to do so. 
It is a serious mistake for all concerned to ignore the fact that organ 
salvage offends natural sensitivities. Ignoring those sensitivities is at the cost 
of dehumanizing the process and coarsening the attitudes of those routinely 
involved. It should be possible to acknowledge the sensitivities and to 
provide opportunities to channel them by ritual and ceremony so that the 
emotional energy is directed in ways which are helpful to the understanding 
and acceptance of the reality of the events. 
The development of symbolic means of directing the emotional 
sensitivities would be of benefit to transplant programs. Relatives would be 
more likely to donate in the event that the process was more humanized. 
Applied to the salvaging and transplantation of human tissue, 
traditionally the concepts of giving and receiving have been considered 
better than the concepts of taking and getting.49 In Australia, the concepts 
of buying and selling human tissue are culturally unacceptable and that 
rejection is expressed in law. It is a criminal offense in all Australian states 
to trade in human tissue, including regenerative tissue such as blood. 50 
The concepts of giving and receiving offer the best context for directing 
sensitivities. The voluntary gift of the organs of a deceased relative preserves 
dignity and respect in contrast to routine salvaging. 
Hospitals and churches could seek to develop some alternative rituals for 
the recognition and acceptance of death according to the whole brain 
criteria and the voluntary transfer of the body by the relatives from the 
treating team to the team responsible for organ salvage, thus marking the 
change in direction of treatment which occurs with the pronouncement of 
brain death. Ceremony and ritual could also be developed to symbolize the 
expression of the emotional significance of foregoing the ordinary 
completion of the laying out of a dead person and instead offering the 
organs for salvage so that others may have life. 
7. Death and the State 
Different states have enacted a variety of legal definitions of death. In 
Australia the common definition is: 
46 
For the purposes of the law in this State, a person had died where there has 
occurred: 
a) irreversible cessation of circulation of blood in the body of the person; or 
b) irreversible cessation of all function of the brain of the person . 
There are a number of advantages in defining death in this way: 
a) The definition permits a judicial determination of the ultimate fact of death . 
The latter is necessary for the operation of many areas of law especially the law 
relating to inheritance and property and the homicide law. 
b) The definition permits a medical determination of the evidentiary fact of 
death. The circulation of the blood and the activity of the brain and brain stem are 
phenomena which can be assessed with reasonable certainty by competent medical 
practitioners. 
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c) The definition does not prescribe the medical criteria which are to be used . 
Thus as medical knowledge and expertise develop, it can be applied to diagnosis of 
the brain functions or circulation of the blood. 
d) The definition would seem to avoid euthanasia. It excludes those who have 
permanently lost consciousness, but does seem to include all those who can be said 
with reasonable certainty to have died . 
e) The definition can operate in both the civil and the criminal law. 
The State has an obligation to intervene in this area. To quote the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: 
For this reason the new technological possibilities which ha ve opened up in the 
field of biomedicine require the intervention of the political authorities and of the 
legislator, since an uncontrolled application of such techniques could lead to 
unforeseeable and damaging consequences for civil society. Recourse to the 
conscience of each individual and to the se lf-regulation of researchers cannot be 
sufficient for ensuring respect for personal rights and public order. If the legislator 
responsible for the common good were not watchful, he could be deprived of his 
prerogatives by researchers claiming to govern humanity in the name of the 
biological discoveries and the alleged "improvement" processes which they would 
draw from those discoveries. 'Eugenism' and forms of discrimination between 
human beings could come to be legitimized: this would constitute an act of 
violence and a serious offense to the equality, dignity and fundamental rights of the 
human person .ll 
This was said in relation to reproductive technology, but it would seem to 
apply equally to the new developments in intensive care medicine and to the 
development of organ transplantation from "beating heart" donors, 
Of grave concern is the danger that ignorance of the medical 
determination of death and the absence of clear moral teaching will lead to 
the widespread belief that the value of human life is being compromised and 
that the dying but not dead are being utilized for organ donations, In a 
climate of acceptance of the practice of euthanasia, this is a real danger. 
Governments and medical authorities have a grave obligation to explain 
what is happening and to ensure that new developments do not occur at 
such a pace that common understanding of the application of moral 
principles lags behind to the moral confusion of many and the creation of 
scandal. 
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